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Abstract
The period 2010–2013 was a time of far-reaching structural reforms of the 
National Health Service in England. Of particular interest in this paper is 
the way in which radical critiques of the reform process were marginal-
ised by pragmatic concerns about how to maintain the market-competition 
thrust of the reforms while avoiding potential fragmentation. We draw 
on the Essex school of political discourse theory and develop a ‘nodal’ 
analytical framework to argue that widespread and repeated appeals 
to a narrative of choice-based integrated care served to take the frag-
mentation ‘sting’ out of radical critiques of the pro-competition reform 
process, to marginalise alternative visions of health and social care, and 
to pre-empt the contestation of a key norm in the provision of health 
care that is closely associated with the notions of ‘any willing provider’ 
and ‘any qualified provider’: provider-blind provision.
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Introduction
There are two features of the recent health care reforms in England that are 
striking and arguably contradictory. First, the two-year passage of the Health 
and Social Care Act (2012) was dominated by contestation and dissent, includ-
ing very public calls for the Health and Social Care Bill to be withdrawn. 
The dissenters included the British Medical Association (BMA), a clutch of 
royal colleges, a former secretary of state for health, various think tanks, the 
opposition party, and even the grass roots of the minor party to the Coalition 
government itself (see Timmins, 2012). Objections were raised regarding the 
role of competition and profit in health care (a long-held objection of the 
BMA), linking this worry to global trends of health care privatisation (see 
Pollock et al., 2012), and the perceived threat to democratic accountability 
and the values of universalism and welfarism (see Pollock et al., 2012 and 
Reynolds and McKee, 2012). The second feature, though, is that despite fears 
that the reforms would prove to be the Coalition’s poll tax (The Guardian, 22 
February 2012), critique and debate over alternative visions was decisively 
marginalised, allowing the Act to proceed with its principal objectives largely 
intact (Leys and Player, 2011; Timmins, 2012). How was this accomplished?
Drawing on the logics approach to critical policy analysis (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007; Howarth, 2010; Glynos and Speed, 2012; Glynos et al., 
2012; West, 2013), we suggest that the marginalisation of critical concerns 
and worries regarding far-reaching pro-competitive reforms in health and 
social care was achieved in large part through the mobilisation of a political 
logic organised around the idea of ‘integrated care’. We treat integration less 
as a concrete vision with a precise meaning and more as an ‘empty signifier’ 
and ‘master political logic’. As an ‘empty signifier’ it served as a receptacle for 
affective investments prompted by perceived threats of disintegration linked 
to unfettered competition. And as a ‘master political logic’ it organised a 
range of ‘minor’ marginalising manoeuvres. In particular, we argue that a set 
of political logics, both organisational and rhetorical, succeeded in policing 
the borders of mainstream official and popular discourse, serving to actively 
marginalise alternative visions of health and social care; and that their suc-
cess is due in part to their capacity to act as a hinge between concrete visions 
on the one hand (cashed out in terms of projected norms and values) and 
potent affective investments on the other hand. In what follows we sum-
marise the background assumptions and basic concepts of a logics approach 
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to the critical explanation of practices, showing how we operationalise it for 
purposes of critical policy analysis through a ‘nodal framework’. We then 
offer a critical account of the process of marginalisation by focusing on key 
moments of contestation in the passage of the Health and Social Care Bill 
(2011) through the legislative process.
Explaining processes of marginalisation: Logics 
approach and nodal framework
Rooted in post-Marxist discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), a log-
ics approach to critical policy analysis affirms the fundamental assumption 
that all social relations are in a constitutive and dynamic relation with struc-
tured fields of meaning marked by radical contingency (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007). In this view the foundations of society are in a crucial sense rhetorical 
since discursive elements and practices are regarded as fundamentally co-con-
stitutive. Equivalences between discursive elements and groups can be drawn 
into sharp friend–enemy frontiers, just as differences can be foregrounded and 
mobilised to break down those frontiers. In this view any existing practice or 
regime is understood as a product of discursively-inflected hegemonic strug-
gles in which political, normative, and ideological dimensions are always in 
play. In focusing on the policy arena we draw particularly on the explana-
tory units of social, political, and fantasmatic logics (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007) to contribute to this broader project of understanding the character and 
evolution of the hegemonic struggle over health care provision and delivery 
in the UK. In this approach, social logics help us characterise a practice or 
regime in terms of its dominant norms, political logics help us characterise 
those processes that tend to contest, de-contest, defend or transform those 
norms, and fantasmatic logics aim to capture the energy with which social 
norms retain their grip or, alternatively, are contested and transformed. The 
reference to fantasmatic logics indexes a concerted effort to supplement exist-
ing approaches to critical policy analysis with conceptual resources drawn 
from psychoanalytic theory (see also Fotaki, 2010 and Hoggett, 2006).
A stylised example drawn from health care may help draw out the char-
acter of these three types of logic and their potentially complex inter-meshing 
and mutually supportive relations. Consider the social logic of care, which 
rests on processes of negotiation, attunement, and adaptation between patient 
and health care professional, and in which any will to choice is trumped by the 
practical constraints of disease and the body’s unpredictable responses (Mol, 
2008). Imagine also a different logic of health care – a social logic of choice 
– in which the relationship between patient and professional is understood 
predominantly via individual choice and market calculation. These compet-
ing logics can find expression in different material practices: while various 
4 C r i t i c a l  S o c i a l  P o l i c y 
practices of consumption and consumer research conform to a logic of choice, 
practices of experimentation, listening patiently to users, and adjusting advice 
iteratively through processes of trial and error might embody a logic of care. 
In normal periods, one or another of these social logics will dominate and its 
associated social practices will largely be taken for granted. In periods of tran-
sition, however, differences between these social logics are brought into relief, 
sometimes more, sometimes less consciously.
Political logics make sense against this background, and may play them-
selves out in any number of modes. For example, in the mode of contestation 
(‘choice versus care’) a political logic that takes its bearing from the logic of 
choice may come to unseat the dominant logic of care. According to the log-
ics approach, however, the efficacy of a given political logic rests not only on 
its normative valence (e.g., logics of choice and calculation are seen as better 
suited to the delivery of health care), but also on its capacity to mobilise affec-
tive attachments (its ideological valence). Here the nature and form of nar-
ratives become of key interest. What is promised and what is portended? In 
our illustrative example, a logic of choice has clear fantasmatic appeals: it can 
draw on the long-standing promise of individual self-determination and self-
sufficiency, pitting itself against the image of the National Health Service 
(NHS) as an authoritarian, resource-hungry bureaucratic Leviathan.
Although in practice social, political, and fantasmatic logics are all opera-
tive at any one time, each being in a relation of over-determination with the 
others, it is often useful to foreground the role of one type of logic to help 
sharpen the analysis. Accordingly, in this paper we foreground integrated 
care as a political logic that operates in such a way as to marginalise critiques 
of the government’s imagined pro-competitive policy reform proposals. Nev-
ertheless, in order to adapt the above-described logics approach to the critical 
analysis of this policy reform process, we have found it helpful, as a first step, 
to draw a distinction between social logics and projected social logics. Techni-
cally, social logics are meant to capture the patterns of self-interpretations of 
subjects engaged in a concrete practice. Logics of care and attunement might 
capture the way health professionals understand their relation to users, but 
they also help characterise the way they interact with one another. Social log-
ics embody certain norms of behaviour, and for this reason we often use the 
terms social logics and norms interchangeably. However, when it comes to 
policy reform, the focus of analysis is not health practices as such, but rather 
‘imagined alternative practices’. For this reason, then, we tend to talk about 
‘projected’ social logics since, strictly speaking, these social logics or norms of 
behaviour have not yet been materialised in concrete practices (see Figure 1).
Drawing a distinction between social logics and projected social log-
ics helps us better understand the political and ideological significance of 
instances of contestation and non-contestation in the reform process. As is 
suggested in Figure 1, we use the distinction to devise a research strategy that 
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focuses on elite policy discourse and debates, tracking the health and social 
care reform process through a series of critical interventions taking place at 
key moments which we will briefly outline in the next section: firstly, the 
initial responses to the White Paper and opposition to the Health and Social 
Care Bill; and secondly, the ‘listening exercise’ and subsequent work of the 
Future Forum. By elite discourse we simply mean to capture the discursive 
utterances of actors occupying positions within the formal policy-making 
orbit, including governmental, party-political, think-tank, campaign group, 
and broadsheet productions. Popular discourse, by contrast, would denote a 
series of discursive productions by actors acting outside this orbit or acting 
in an informal capacity, and would invariably comprise a rich source of fan-
tasmatic narratives and investments that help account for the inertia of exist-
ing regimes or the energy with which regimes undergo transformation (for a 
particularly insightful discussion of this relation in the context of health care 
policy in a choice regime, see Fotaki, 2010).
In terms of our methodological tactics, we have focused our analysis 
around a small set of key policy-making actors, in particular the King’s Fund, 
Figure 1. The arena of public discourse.
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the Nuffield Foundation, and the Future Forum, as well as the government 
itself. It is important to stress here that while we focus on the discursive 
productions of these prominent actors, it is not their specific interests and 
objectives that interest us so much as the logics they project, and the politi-
cal logics of marginalisation evident in their discursive productions. In other 
words, in this paper we are interested primarily in the overall pattern or effects 
of a series of interventions by a range of agencies rather than their underlying 
motivations. As we will go on to show, we argue that rhetorical strategies 
combined in complex ways around the trope of integration to produce suf-
ficient consensus to forestall revolt against the main thrust of the proposed 
health and social care reforms.
However, in order to better understand how exactly the integration 
imperative can be understood as a master political logic that has marginalised 
more radical critiques and alternative visions of the provision of health and 
social care, we supplement the above-described logics approach with an ana-
lytical framework that identifies four nodes along the health and social care 
service chain: provision, distribution, delivery, and governance (drawing on 
Glynos and Speed, 2012) (see Figure 2).
We can now be more precise about the role particular social logics (or 
projected social logics) play because we can situate them in relation to par-
ticular nodes along the whole service chain. Each node foregrounds distinct 
sets of questions and concerns regarding service reform. The node of provision 
is largely about which services need to be provided and the conditions under 
which such provision can be instituted, the node of distribution is about how 
users find out about such services and their conditions of access (e.g., universal 
access, co-payments, etc.), the node of delivery is about the norms that shape 
Node of
Provision
Node of
Distribu!on
Node of
Delivery
Node of
Governance
Figure 2. Nodes along the health care service chain.
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the relationship between health professionals and users (e.g., concerning the 
treatment process, the exchange of knowledge, the role of technology, etc.), 
and the node of governance is about how the norms characterising the node-
specific practices are evaluated, maintained, or transformed (see Table 1 for a 
more complete sketch of this range of emphases).
The benefit of this nodal framework is that it allows us to distribute iden-
tified social logics across the nodes depending on which are more relevant to 
our analytical focus, and enabling us, in particular, to be much more precise 
about the norms in relation to which one can understand logics of margin-
alisation. Table 2 offers a stylised illustration of what such a set of projected 
social logics might look like as a function of nodes.
In this paper, however, our analysis centres on the node of provision, 
giving our analysis of the documents from the government, King’s Fund and 
Nuffield a clear focus; we read these documents with the following question 
in mind: what do these documents have to say about existing (or projected) 
norms with which service provision is (or can be) organised?
The development of this nodal framework helps us better understand 
the marginalisation process in terms of political logics. This is because the 
sense and significance of qualifying a logic as political emerges only in rela-
tion to particular norms embodied in identified social logics. Political logics 
marginalise efforts to contest and debate norms that many consider worthy 
of contestation, and as we will see later, a key norm we identify as worthy of 
contestation is embodied in what we term the social logic of provider-blind 
provision: the idea that our decision to choose a service should be governed by 
its capacity to provide a good service, not the type of provider-organisation 
offering that service. This enables us to see how the discourse of King’s Fund 
and Nuffield, while not wholly uncritical of government policy, nonetheless 
works very much with the grain of official discourse – that health care reform 
in the UK demands we create opportunities for a wide range of organisa-
tions to provide services under conditions of formal equality. The integra-
tion imperative appears as a master political logic because its invocation has 
tended to pre-empt or narrow the scope of debate around the contestation of 
the provider-blind norm in the node of provision; and that this, in turn, is 
because integration has been understood predominantly through the wider 
hegemonic discourse of choice (as opposed to ‘care’, for example).
In what follows we situate the integration imperative in a wider discursive 
terrain, particularly the regime of market choice, in order to better understand 
the political and ideological significance of instances of contestation and non-
contestation in the reform process. To anticipate briefly, we could say that 
the regime of choice places the user at the centre of health and social care and, 
in this view, choice is understood to be motivated by the prospect of users’ 
preference satisfaction and materialised via discrete transactions. We begin, 
however, with a brief overview of the health and social care reform process.
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Table 1. Node features.
NODE OF PROVISION (what/how care services are made available)
‘logics of appearance’
About, for example…
• aligning/coordinating different providers of different sizes to serve interests or 
revealed preferences
• aligning/coordinating different levels (individual, community, local, regional, 
national) to serve interests or revealed preferences
• aligning/coordinating commissioners and providers
• specifying/promoting (or not specifying/promoting) an ideal character of eligible 
providers (i.e., about how care services should be produced from ‘internal’ organ-
isational perspective: how is care service workforce organised; who appropriates 
surplus labour; who decides how surplus labour is distributed; and how are such 
decisions made?)
• aligning firm-level ends with wider public aims
• aligning owner, manager, and worker interests
NODE OF DISTRIBUTION (how care services are distributed: given that a 
service exists (has ‘appeared’), how do users get ‘matched up’ with it: how do 
users gain access to it and to what degree, if at all)
‘matching logics’
About, for example…
• linking together users, service providers, and third-party information to ensure 
smooth–efficient matching processes and/or good matching results, but not 
always reducible to information dissemination
• whether there are conditionality constraints on accessing health and social care
• universalism versus residualism
NODE OF DELIVERY (given that a service exists, how is it delivered from 
the perspective of the interface between user and professional carer)
‘logics of performance’
About, for example…
• how professional knowledge (latest scientific developments) and user experience 
and knowledge are linked
• how new technological developments (directly or indirectly health/care related) 
and user experience are linked
• how health and care models are invoked and negotiated by professionals and 
users
NODE OF GOVERNANCE (reflecting on and evaluating care service provi-
sion, distribution, and delivery from the point of view of accountability and 
regulatory effectiveness, and acting on those evaluations)
‘feedback logics and action logics’
• pertains to questions of surveying, assessment, legitimation, stabilisation and 
continuity, and/or improvement and transformation
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A brief sketch of the health and social care 
reform process
On 9 May 2010 an agreement was reached between the Conservative Party and 
the Liberal Democrat Party to form a coalition for the next UK parliamentary 
term. Neither party had an electoral mandate for restructuring the National 
Health Service. Indeed, part of the Coalition agreement was an explicit state-
ment that there would be no more top-down restructuring of the NHS. Yet, 
just a few months later, in October, the then Conservative Secretary of State 
for Health and Social Care, Andrew Lansley, had produced a complete White 
Paper detailing what have come to be labelled the most far-reaching reforms 
of the National Health Service in its sixty-five year history (DH, 2010; Tim-
mins, 2012). The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care was clearly 
keen to press ahead with reform, immediately implementing what he could 
without primary legislation (such as the re-organisation of Primary Care 
Trusts and the Strategic Health Authorities [Timmins, 2012]), whilst also 
seeking to lock key elements of the reform into statute – the removal of the 
state from day to day management of the NHS, the introduction of general 
Table 2. Projected social logics of the government and the King’s Fund: a stylised 
illustration.
Projected social logics, King’s Fund Projected social logics, government
NODE OF PROVISION
• Preference and needs-based provision • Preference-based provision
• User-centred integrated provision • Competition-driven provision
• Provider-blind provision • Provider-blind provision
NODE OF DISTRIBUTION
• Pro-active brokerage (actively identify-
ing needs)
• Informed choice
• Unconditionality with top-up option-
ality (shared fiscal responsibility)
• Conditionality (fiscal and 
behavioural)
NODE OF DELIVERY
• Professional-facilitated person-centred 
care
• Informed choice
• Integrated • Discrete transactions
• Technology-led co-production • Technology-led co-production
NODE OF GOVERNANCE
• Outcome-based evaluation (as opposed 
to process-based evaluation)
• Outcome-based evaluation
• Controlled/managed competition • Light-touch pro-competitive 
regulation
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practitioner commissioning, and the fashioning of a new regulatory panoply 
(Speed and Gabe, 2013). However, dissent quickly arose. The Health and 
Social Care Bill was introduced to the House of Commons in January 2011, 
but its passage through Parliament was far from smooth. In March 2011, the 
largest doctors’ union, the British Medical Association (BMA) called for the 
Bill to be scrapped, and in early April the government announced an almost 
unprecedented ‘listening exercise’ – a ‘pause’ in the legislative process – to 
allow the government to ‘listen, reflect and improve’ (Hawkes, 2011) the 
proposals. This would enable the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State 
‘time to try to find compromise amendments’ (Leys and Player, 2011: 70) and 
to enable them to demonstrate they had listened to public and professional 
opinions (Leys and Player, 2011).
As part of this ‘listening exercise’, the NHS Future Forum was set up to 
investigate proposed reforms and consult widely and then report back to the 
Secretary of State – a forum largely sympathetic to the general direction of the 
reforms (Timmins, 2012). One key theme it was asked to probe was ‘the role 
of choice and competition [could play] for improving quality’ (DH, 2011). 
Choice and competition were the central elements of Lansley’s ambition to 
create a self-regulating health service: market-based incentives would be set 
in train and Monitor, as the arm’s length statutory regulator, would ensure 
that commissioning decisions respected the competition imperative, obviat-
ing the need for the government to be involved in the day to day management 
of the NHS. Giving up on choice and competition would have meant aban-
doning the reform project of self-regulation and the idea of a ‘restructuring 
to end all restructuring’. Although the twin ideals of choice and competition 
were already present in the NHS before Lansley’s reforms, elevating competi-
tion to the status of regulatory principle was always bound to be controversial. 
Something was needed to lend legitimacy to this reform. In our view, the 
appeal to integration forms a key part of this story, and in order to appreciate 
the rhetorical and political role integration played during the ‘pause’, we turn 
to the initial reactions to the White Paper and Bill.
First reactions to the White Paper and Bill: 
Competition, fragmentation, and the promise of 
integration
The reforms outlined in the White Paper can be understood to further insti-
tute and deepen a liberalisation and marketisation trend set in motion during 
the Thatcher and New Labour eras, resonating with ideas like the ‘provider/
purchaser split’ and the ‘third way’. It is clear, however, that important 
though competition was to New Labour, the White Paper and Bill made 
competition, and the accompanying notion of ‘any willing provider’, the 
cardinal organising principle of reform. Competition would – via the ‘any 
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willing provider’ stipulation – ensure that user choice would be maximised at 
most levels and sectors of health care:
Our aim is to free up provision of healthcare, so that in most sectors of care, 
any willing provider can provide services, giving patients greater choice and 
ensuring effective competition stimulates innovation and improvements, and 
increases productivity within a social market. (DH, 2010: 37)
A clear but rather familiar frontier was being rhetorically constructed, sepa-
rating the efficiency of market competition in generating choice for the user 
on the one hand, from the inefficiencies of state provision and unaccount-
able medical professionals on the other hand. Market competition would 
unleash creativity and innovation and thereby increase productivity. It would 
also maximise efficiencies for the taxpayer and multiply choices for the user. 
But the reaction to the White Paper and Bill was both swift and direct. The 
renewed boost to the competition imperative and the introduction of ‘any 
willing provider’ into the lexicon of health care reform raised the spectre of 
privatisation, and associated fears of disintegration, fragmentation, and a 
general undermining of cooperation and quality of services in many areas of 
health care.
The NHS Support Federation (2010), a campaign group aimed at ‘pro-
tecting and promoting the founding principles of the NHS’, criticised the 
‘flawed vision’ of the market-based model. Fragmentation was seen in terms 
of a diminishing capacity to pool risks, as providers would compete against 
each other for the most ‘lucrative’ services and seek to divest the most costly. 
Health Emergency (2010: 1), another campaigning organisation voiced con-
cerns about ‘the fragmentation and privatisation of the NHS’ and the promise 
of ‘£20 billion of spending cuts by 2014’. Similarly, the NHS Consultants 
Association (NCA), together with Keep Our NHS Public (KONP), were 
instrumental in organising a letter from the BMA to the Times and Financial 
Times newspapers, dated 13 December 2010:
BMA policy is to uphold the founding principles of the NHS (which are held dear 
by British citizens) that health care should be on the basis of public provision not 
private ownership, co-operation not competition, integration not fragmentation 
and public service not private profits. Four out of five doctors believe the reforms 
will not benefit patients. (http://abetternhs.wordpress.com/2010/12/13/letters-
to-times-and-financial-times/)
Formal consultation on the White Paper closed in October 2010 and despite 
widespread objections, the Health and Social Care Bill was introduced to the 
House of Commons in January 2011. Opposition from professional groups 
continued to mount, however, and the highly influential British Medical Jour-
nal published a roundup of concerns related to the Bill (BMJ, 2011b). These 
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included worries expressed by the Royal College of General Practitioners and 
the Royal College of Physicians among others, linked to ‘fragmentation and 
unnecessary duplication’, threats to ‘quality of service’, and the spectre of ‘less 
choice and fewer services’ as well as ‘increase[d] bureaucratic costs’ (BMJ, 
2011b). The BMA was especially worried about how ‘[f]orcing commission-
ers of care to tender contracts to any willing provider … could … allow large 
commercial companies to enter the NHS market and chase the most profit-
able contracts, using their size to undercut on price, which could ultimately 
damage local services’ (BMJ, 2011b).
These responses show how, early on, there was a clear and vocal effort to 
contest moves to turn competition (and the accompanying notion of ‘any will-
ing provider’) into a master principle with which to organise the provision of 
health care services in the NHS. Advocate organisations marshalled a series of 
rhetorical and political logics aiming to break down the equivalence between 
competition, efficiency, and maximisation of choice, instead constructing a 
different equivalential frontier linking competition and fragmentation. Draw-
ing on precisely these rhetorical logics, the Labour shadow health spokesman 
Andy Burnham, speaking at a fringe meeting of the Labour Party Conference 
in the autumn of 2012, dubbed the reforms as ‘the fast track to fragmentation’ 
(The Guardian, 3 October, 2012). Already, however, the idea of integration 
was emerging as a master counter-principle to affirm in quelling worries asso-
ciated with the competition imperative. While the Coalition’s proposals for 
reform were seen as risking fragmentation, integration was now widely under-
stood to be ‘the thing that was needed’ and ‘the thing that must be protected’.1
The contestation of competition was thus forcefully and overwhelm-
ingly established by linking competition to the spectre of fragmentation. 
It was unclear, however, whether competition was necessarily incompatible 
with integration. Much would depend on the meaning attributed to integra-
tion. However, beyond its possible concrete meanings, we wish to emphasise 
how integration functioned as a term that attracted high levels of affective 
investment and allegiance in the wider domain of public discourse, largely 
on account of its ‘empty’ oppositional status (it is clearly against fragmenta-
tion, but it is less clear what it stands for more positively and concretely). 
Nevertheless, as we will see now, a logic of compatibilisation was available for 
rhetorical deployment by a number of policy-making actors in the domain of 
policy discourse.
Responses to the initial reactions: Competition 
serves integration
Given the mounting opposition to the Bill, an almost unprecedented halt 
in the legislative process was called in April 2011. Here we focus on the 
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government-endorsed responses issued through the Future Forum reports. 
Given the frontier now separating competition and integration and the 
emerging rhetoric of ‘competition versus integration’, the task facing sup-
porters of the pro-competition reforms was to render these compatible. But 
how exactly? As Leys and Arnold (2011) point out, there is nothing intrinsic 
to the idea of integrated health care that suggests a need for competition. Inte-
gration is fundamentally about coordination and planning (Leys and Arnold, 
2011), and perhaps this is why the trope of competition versus integration 
resonated so powerfully. The job of rendering the two compatible, whether 
knowingly or not, fell to the Future Forum.
As indicated earlier, one of the Future Forum’s key remits was to publish 
a formal report on the controversial topic of choice and competition (Future 
Forum, 2011b). That controversy, as we have discussed, tended to centre on 
the fragmentation that competition would produce, but the Forum had no 
specific instructions to examine integration as such. It nonetheless commis-
sioned a joint report on integration in health and social care from the King’s 
Fund and the Nuffield Trust (Goodwin et al., 2012) – both highly influential 
health think tanks (see Shaw et al., 2014) – which was published in January 
2012. The King’s Fund in particular, under its Chief Executive, Professor 
Chris Ham, had already produced a considerable body of work on integration. 
Thus, as integration was already a key concept in the work of the King’s Fund 
and the Nuffield Foundation, the legislative ‘pause’ served as an opportunity 
to remobilise the concept to allay fears of fragmentation.
Here we focus on a corpus of texts centred on the King’s Fund/Nuffield 
Foundation/Future Forum nexus. One report in particular, Curry and Ham 
(2010), is liberally cited in both the King’s Fund/Nuffield commissioned 
report (Goodwin et al., 2012) and the Future Forum’s later survey (2012) of 
integration across English health and social care, this intertextual-citational 
feature making it worthy of special focus. The report is technical in tone, 
seeking to clarify the many meanings of integration and the various levels in 
the health care system at which it operates (macro, meso, micro), but it also 
has political import in that it places the theme of integration on an equal foot-
ing with, in its view, the ‘even greater emphasis being placed on choice and 
competition’ since the change of government (Curry and Ham, 2010: 1). For 
the King’s Fund, it was not so much that choice and competition were prob-
lematic, but that the government’s view of unfettered competition needed 
to give way to a more ‘nuanced debate about the direction of reform that 
recognises the possibility of integration and competition both having a part 
to play in improving performance’ (Curry and Ham, 2010: 1). Having taken 
issue throughout the report with the government’s vision of commission-led 
competition, the authors seek common ground with the government on the 
centrality of patient choice in articulating what (from a patient’s perspective) 
is a very attractive vision of future health care:
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If competition between clinically integrated systems evolves in England, patients 
would choose both their practice and the consortium that commissions their 
care. They would also have choice within the integrated provider network or 
networks under contract to the consortium. In addition, patients could be offered 
the choice of specialist providers outside these networks to create an incentive for 
network providers to offer care that is responsive and high quality. (Curry and 
Ham, 2010: 46)
Competition and patient choice were thus not ruled out. It was, rather, a 
matter of educating the government on the difference between the means and 
the ends of competition. In their view, competition can and should be put in 
the service of integration. Thus, ‘competition between integrated systems is 
likely to be more effective … than competition between fragmented systems’ 
(Curry and Ham, 2010: 46).
The Future Forum’s report on choice and competition, for its part, was 
more bullish on the question of the compatibility of competition and integra-
tion. It states:
We have … heard many people saying that competition and integration are 
opposing forces. We believe this is a false dichotomy. Integrated care is vital, and 
competition can and should be used by commissioners as a powerful tool to drive 
this for patients. (Future Forum, 2011a: 6)
This is reiterated in the Forum’s final summary report (Future Forum, 2011b) 
presented to the government on 13 June 2011. Its broad conclusion is that 
while the provisions of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act need to make 
the objective of integrated care explicit, there is no necessary or inevitable 
incompatibility between integration and competition. Competition must be 
managed to avoid the worst excesses of ‘cherry picking’ and market domi-
nance (see Future Forum, 2011a: 5–6, section on ‘managed competition’), 
but is, in fact, necessary for integration and, indeed, for the very survival of 
the NHS (Future Forum, 2011b: 25). Its recommendation was that Monitor 
take its primary duty to be not the promotion of competition, but rather the 
safeguarding of ‘the best care for patients’ through ‘the delivery of integrated 
care’ (Future Forum, 2011b: 25).
In this way, the Future Forum corpus brought a degree of discursive clo-
sure on the question of the role and place of competition in the health and 
social care reforms. But it did not convince everybody. Julian Le Grand, Tony 
Blair’s former choice tsar, and Alan Millburn, former Blairite health secretary, 
were concerned that this change of emphasis would weaken the competition 
imperative (Timmins, 2012). But there were still plenty of misgivings in the 
opposite direction – that untrammelled competition would reign and that 
more needed to be done to protect and promote integration (expressed, nota-
bly, by some of the Royal Colleges and the BMA).
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The report from Goodwin et al. (2012), commissioned by the Future 
Forum and following a series of workshops on integration in the October and 
November of 2011 proceeds with studied caution on the question of the com-
patibility of competition and integration. It argues:
choice and competition policy … appears at times to run contrary to the desire 
in many sites for more integrated care (Ham and Smith 2010). The key issue 
here is the unit of competition and whether this is defined narrowly (eg, for an 
annual foot check) or broadly (eg, for a year of care to a diabetic). It also begs the 
question as to how competition should operate – should it be competition for 
the market (ie, tendering to providers) or within the market (ie, patient choice 
of location and caregiver). (Goodwin et al., 2012: 8, emphasis in the original)
The question of ‘the right unit of competition’ is not answered but, as with 
the earlier King’s Fund report (Curry and Ham, 2010), we are left in no doubt 
that, provided that the end is integrated care, there ought to be choice and 
competition.2
Indeed a further Future Forum report, instigated during a second phase of 
‘the listening exercise’ reinforced the compatibilising logic that makes com-
petition serve integrated care via the rhetoric of choice. An emblematic figure 
stalks this report – a fictitious octogenarian – ‘Mrs Crabtree from number 3’ 
– and it is on her outcomes (along with others – Jim and Ben and his mum) 
that we are entreated to focus. This figurative device leads on to the assertion 
that patients know best what their everyday needs are and that the choices 
they make can drive efficiencies through competitively structured systems 
and thereby ensure integrated outcomes (Future Forum, 2012: 15).
In a series of rhetorical moves, then, integration was elevated to the status 
of overriding objective of the NHS and competition had come to be seen as 
essential to its realisation. If the rhetoric of reaction analysed earlier can be 
characterised in terms of ‘Integration versus Competition’, we have now shown 
how a compatibilising rhetoric enabled the response ‘Competition serves Inte-
gration’. Rendering integration and competition compatible was made pos-
sible through an appeal to choice: competition is about choice (the choice of 
commissioners, but ultimately the choice of users), but integration is also 
about choice (the user can choose the best integrated package of care, or can 
herself construct-integrate a bespoke package of care). In other words, com-
petition and integration are rendered compatible by situating both within a 
regime of choice. What we see, then, is the operation of a compatibilising rheto-
ric of choice. Competition and integration are no longer seen as opposites, but 
allies in the fight to pull the NHS back from the brink of collapse. Moreover, 
competition now appears to have acquired a clearer rationale that was argu-
ably lacking in Lansley’s White Paper.
The rise of integration to an overarching imperative has served to mobil-
ise and organise a range of moves and logics, of which the compatibilising 
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rhetoric of choice was one of the most energetically performed. What is not 
clear, however, is how and why we should understand the appeal to integrated 
care and the compatibilising rhetoric of choice as a specifically political logic. 
In order to appreciate why, we need to return to our earlier discussion of social 
logics, more specifically the norms that they embody and that we consider 
worth contesting.
Integrated care as a political logic: On the 
contestability of provider-blind provision, and 
the critical potential of provider pluralism
Integrated care can be conceptualised in concrete terms as a particular vision, 
which – in turn – we can understand as a function of the different nodes along 
the service chain. In relation to the node of provision, this might appear as 
a way of coordinating different providers to serve the interests (or revealed 
preferences) of users and the public at large, for example by aligning firm-
level ends with wider public aims, including allowing commissioners to be 
providers themselves under certain conditions. Lansley’s idea of a self-regu-
lating system offers one such vision of integration – a vision that relies heav-
ily on competition, information dissemination, and user choice, to do this 
coordinating work. In the node of distribution, integration might appear as a 
way of linking together users, service providers, and third-party information 
to ensure that users are well-matched with services. In the node of delivery, 
integration might appear in the different ways professional, scientific, and 
technological developments and knowledge are integrated to enhance user 
experience, particularly in complex needs cases where issues of health and 
social care over-determine one another. In relation to the node of governance, 
integration can refer to the way the evaluation of service provision, distribu-
tion, and delivery informs and lends legitimacy to ongoing practices and their 
transformation.
But integrated care need not be understood only in terms of a concrete 
vision. We have thus emphasised how integration also functioned as a site 
of affective investment and source of hope, particularly when set against the 
spectre of fragmentation. Here integration can be understood as an ‘empty’ 
signifier – that is ambiguous as to its content. We argue, however, that we 
can also understand the appeal to integrated care as a political logic. In order to 
transform our understanding of the integration imperative and its associated 
choice-based compatibilising logic from rhetorical device to political logic, it 
is essential to bring it into explicit relation with a norm (or norms) we con-
sider worthy of contestation (or defence). The political dimension of the rhet-
oric of integration appears against this background, because it is only with 
reference to the contestability of one or another projected social logic that 
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we can identify its political role in instituting, defending, or – in this case – 
pre-emptively marginalising processes of contestation and critique. Since the 
focus of our textual analysis so far has been on the node of provision, we will 
consider the projected social logics of this node in more detail, the norm of 
provider-blind provision in particular.
As noted earlier the node of provision is organised around the question 
of how services – here health services – appear on the scene. We can begin 
by focusing on a key problem outlined in the White Paper: the lack of good 
quality services in some areas and a lack of innovation and efficiency. One-
size-fits-all state monopoly provision is seen as inefficient, delivering poor 
results. This leads to the argument that there should be a much wider range 
of firms providing services, since different organisational structures may 
work better than others to quality and efficiency standards in different times 
and environments (DH, 2010). The White Paper’s projected social logics in 
the node of provision tend to take their cue from the preferences revealed in 
potential user choices, and in this context competition among ‘any willing 
providers’ holds out the hope of dispensing with government interference in 
the affairs of the NHS.
But the government was not alone in problematising the social logic of 
monopoly state provision and regulation. The King’s Fund’s projected social 
logics in the node of provision also take their cue from potential user prefer-
ences, but extend their scope to include potential user needs. In this view com-
petition must be structured so as to be sensitive to these needs too. According 
to the King’s Fund, the solution is to be found in integrating services around 
the needs of the patient and striking a balance between competition and plan-
ning. However, and crucially, it need not necessarily be the state doing the 
planning since this could be contracted out to independent integrated care 
providers: ‘integrated care organisations could be in the vanguard of the … 
innovations needed to improve performance, especially if there is competition 
among integrated care organisations’ (Curry and Ham, 2010: 1).
A key projected norm we have thus identified across both the White Paper 
and the King’s Fund report, is what we have termed a social logic of provider-
blind provision: the idea that our decision to choose a service provider should be 
governed by the organisation’s capacity to provide a good service, not the type 
of organisation offering that service. While this finds itself expressed as ‘any 
willing provider’ in the White Paper, we could say that the idea of ‘any will-
ing integrated care provider’ can express the equivalent King’s Fund view. For 
neither is it any longer a case of the state being default monopoly or dominant 
provider. We have named this social logic provider-blind provision because it 
makes more explicit the steer given to commissioners to treat all contenders 
as formally equal in the competitive bidding process: commissioners are sup-
posed to be ‘blind’ as to contenders’ size or internal organisational structure, 
caring only about the quality of services they promise to provide.3
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Our argument is that the political dimension of the master logic of inte-
gration can be appreciated when it is understood in relation to a norm con-
sidered worthy of contestation and/or defence. Once we have a fix on norms 
worthy of contestation, tactics and strategies can be qualified as political log-
ics in relation to them. Integrated care and the accompanying compatibilis-
ing rhetoric of choice can thus be understood as a political logic because it 
naturalises the social logic of provider-blind provision and marginalises or 
pre-empts efforts to open up for serious debate and discussion a series of ques-
tions linked to this norm.
The most obvious question raised by the emphasis placed on provider-blind 
provision can be evoked by contrasting it with a possible alternative social logic: 
provider pluralism. It is, of course, true that official government documents, the 
Future Forum reports, as well as the King’s Fund and Nuffield papers, talk 
about the virtues of pluralism. The Future Forum report on integration devotes 
a section to the need to ‘[f]ree up voluntary and community sector organisa-
tions’ (Future Forum, 2012: 27), noting the ‘widespread support for expanding 
the role of voluntary and community sector organisations in designing path-
ways and providing services’ (2012: 27). The King’s Fund/Nuffield report, for 
its part, acknowledges the role that the independent and community sectors can 
play in ‘developing new models of care’ (Goodwin et al., 2012: 2). The Future 
Forum’s report on Choice and Competition also talks of the need to ‘promote a 
diversity of providers’ (Future Forum, 2011a: 9). What is notable across all 
documents, however, is the rather considerable faith placed on choice-based 
competition among willing providers to deliver pluralism, particularly in the 
government-sponsored Future Forum reports. There is little to no guidance on 
how integrated health care systems can be oriented towards provider plural-
ism, nor do the Future Forum’s recommendations indicate how Monitor might 
maintain or promote provider pluralism in the application of competition rules.
What is striking, therefore, is the absence of serious and sustained scru-
tiny of an alternative norm organised around provider pluralism. If patterned 
state monopoly provision is the target of critiques coming from the govern-
ment and from the King’s Fund and Nuffield, the move to provider-blind 
provision appears to be too quick, missing out a whole spectrum of alter-
native patterned provision options, of which provider pluralism would be 
one. Of course, provider pluralism is patterned in the rather minimal sense 
that a broad ecology of providers would need to be actively monitored and 
maintained to avoid the dominance of specific providers or types of providers. 
Yet when viewed from the perspective of even this ‘minimal’ alternative pro-
jected norm, provider-blind pluralism can appear uncomfortably silent along 
a number of dimensions:
 • the number of organisations that would make an adequate pool within 
which competition could properly take hold;
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 • the range of organisation types that would make up a robust and resil-
ient organisational ecology of providers;
 • whether specific organisation types should be championed in the 
delivery of health care (e.g., mutuals or cooperatives), or on the con-
trary, should be presumed to be unsuitable (e.g., for-profit organisa-
tions subject to the shareholder value imperative);
 • whether the system capacity to pool risks is protected from selective 
‘cherry-picking’ tendencies;
 • the broader economic context and trends, elite networks, and power 
nexus within which particular organisations or types of organisations 
come to compete and operate in the existing and projected regime of 
health and social care.4
The rationale for treating integrated care as a political logic should be clear 
now. Integrated care has certainly been given renewed impetus and status in 
the light of fears about unfettered competition in health care. In our read-
ing, however, it functions as a political logic insofar as it reinforces, and pre-
empts the contestation of, the norm of provider-blind provision. Taking our 
lead from the above-mentioned ‘silences’, we can be more specific about how 
appeals to integrated care and choice-based compatibilising logics push to the 
margins inquiries that might explore a further range of issues:
 • the justice of any one organisation’s economic process, particularly con-
cerning the appropriation of surplus labour and workers’ capacity to shape 
the decisions of their organisation, including their working conditions;
 • whether the economic logics at the site of production/delivery are con-
ducive to norms of good health and social care.
Drawing a distinction between provider-blind provision and provider pluralism 
opens up these sorts of questions to critical normative scrutiny, enabling us 
to draw productively on the work of a range of normative political theorists, 
critical political economists, and critical health care researchers. The sense and 
significance of integration, for example, may shift as we situate it in relation 
to regimes other than a choice regime: care, paternal care, or recognition, for 
example. Instead of placing the emphasis on the choice or preferences of the 
user, a regime of care might emphasise the good of the user as it is expressed 
and developed dialogically with health care workers; a regime of paternal care 
might emphasise the good of the user as judged by the state, the corporation, 
or by any one of a number of health professional bodies; and a regime of rec-
ognition might emphasise the good of the user and health worker.
What we have sought to do in this paper is explain how choice-based 
integrated care as political logic acts to normalise provider-blind provision, 
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obscuring wider contextual features linked to the landscape of power rela-
tions, hegemonic struggle, and ideological investments. When choice-based 
integrated care is allied with the norm of provider-blind provision, we can 
see that even the presentation of only non-profit exemplars of integrated care 
in the government’s White Paper and the Future Forum’s reports could be 
understood as a political logic. The appeal to non-profit organisations as priv-
ileged or paradigm illustrations deflects attention away from the considerable 
resources at the disposal of for-profit global health conglomerates. But, choice-
based integration is also a master political logic, insofar as it gives a range of 
minor political logics a principle of articulation and suasive power, linking 
together what might otherwise appear as rather disparate elements: choice, 
personalisation, austerity, the demographic ‘time bomb’, or professionalisa-
tion. The political dimension of appeals to personalisation and choice-driven 
integrated care is also foregrounded when they serve to marginalise issues 
linked to the status, identity, and conditions of health and social care workers. 
But other rhetorical manoeuvres too can appear as political logics of margin-
alisation when viewed from the point of view of the projected social logic of 
provider-blind provision, for example, the often-repeated assertion by gov-
ernment that the pro-competition reforms were ‘merely’ the completion of a 
project instigated by the previous New Labour government.5
Two final points are worth making. First, one key implication of this 
type of logics-cum-node analysis is that the intention of the parties involved 
is not essential to our capacity to characterise particular logics as political or 
not. Qualifying a logic as political serves as a critical device for identifying 
what discursive-rhetorical moves have political and ideological significance. 
Second, it is worth noting here that political logics are energised by fantasies 
operative at both policy level (e.g., market fantasies) and popular level (e.g., 
fantasies of personal independence and mastery). The persistence of integra-
tion as a long-standing and highly invested organising ideal in health care 
already attests to its fantasmatic appeal, but it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore the fantasmatic dimension of integration fully. Suffice to 
say that this is also key to its hegemonic grip: it mobilises anxieties linked to 
fragmentation and complexity in everyday life, but also holds out the promise 
of our regaining control over our fate.
Concluding remarks
In the past, state monopoly provision was seen as a huge improvement over 
the previous regime in which there was no collective health insurance mecha-
nism in place; but 60 years later, the NHS is faced with many modern chal-
lenges. We do not seek to deny those challenges, but only to point out how 
the present context has been problematised in such a way as to steer policy 
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makers too quickly away from state monopoly provision to provider-blind 
provision. The quick move to a regime of choice-based competitive provision 
clearly leaves out other possible patterned forms of provision, particularly 
the option of provision-pluralism. The move is also highly seductive because 
it resonates with wider discourses and fantasies linked to choice, autonomy, 
personalisation, independence, and the potential of telecare systems of care. 
Integrated care has worked as a master political logic of marginalisation in 
this move, and its success is partly due to its capacity to act as a master politi-
cal logic or conduit through which a set of wider discourses and fantasies can 
play themselves out. The most troubling aspect of this political logic is the 
way crucial considerations are shuffled to the margins of substantive debate in 
both policy and media domains. It is thus important to bring fully into view 
how integrated care and its associated ‘minor’ political logics are (or are likely 
to be) performed in and outside the policy arena by key actors embedded in 
specific institutional and power networks. But it is not just that protect-
ing the norm of provider-blind provision tends to direct attention away from 
broader ideological contexts and power dynamics. Just as important is the 
related tendency not to look too closely into the internal dynamics of organ-
isations that seek to provide and deliver health services, particularly from the 
point of view of wider efforts to democratise the workplace.
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Notes
1. It is worth noting here that integration in health and social care is not a new con-
cept. Indeed as a signifier of better coordination of health and social care services 
and greater efficiency it predates even the foundation of the NHS (Rumbold and 
Shaw, 2010) and is a concept that has been repeatedly invoked in periods of NHS 
restructuring, particularly those which have tended to create gaps in service pro-
vision (Rumbold and Shaw, 2010).
2. An interview with David Bennett, the head of Monitor, clearly demonstrates 
how this script of ‘choice and competition serves integration’ opens up a variety 
of possibilities for the promotion of competition in health care: see Nuffield 
Trust (2011).
3. During the passage of the Bill, the term ‘any willing provider’ was replaced by 
the term ‘any qualified provider’ (Sturgeon, 2014). Although it is widely thought 
that this was more a change of terminology than substance (see BMJ, 2011a), it 
can also be seen as another kind of pre-emptive political logic that marginalises 
efforts to ‘open up’ the ‘black box’ of providers’ organisational structures (e.g., in 
terms of their economic processes or the democratic character of the workplace).
4. For references to sources that analyse and map revolving doors between govern-
ment, Whitehall, and corporate health conglomerates see Shaw et al. (2014).
22 C r i t i c a l  S o c i a l  P o l i c y 
5. This tactic was evident, for example, in the Minister for Health’s explanation 
(Hansard, 2013) in March 2013 of amendments to the controversial ‘Regulation 
75’ which put in place legal provisions for the regulation of competition (Reyn-
olds, 2013). Here, explicit reference to integration as a regulatory criterion sig-
nified additional safeguards against rampant competition that, it was claimed, 
were not present under the old rules governing competition in the NHS. In 
practice, though, the amendments offered no clarity as to the balance to be struck 
between competition and integration in regulatory decisions (see Ham, 2013).
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